Reasons why we should OPPOSE Aadhaar

Response to the article Nine reasons why we should support Aadhaar

 

              The article by Sri . Bhamy V Shenoy titled “Nine reasons why we should support Aadhaar” yet another example of how unfounded the arguments for AADHAAR are. The author criticizes the media which has now began to come out with studied opinions on the project. He also finds fault with the NGOs that are reluctant to support Aadhaar which will solve the problems of corruption and leakages in welfare schemes that they are confronted with in their day to day activities. Further he accuses the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance (SCoF) of throwing the baby out with bath water. He is right in pointing out that the SCoF has not advanced any new arguments or rationale to oppose aadhaar. But is does not mean that the arguments are irrelevant. Rather it reveals the failure of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) in addressing the concerns and defending the project though they had a prior knowledge of the questionnaire they would need to answer. It was the nature of the project form the very beginning shrouded in a fog of silence, impudence, ignorance and opacity.

On the Dissent notes in SCoF Report.

The author who complaints about the media of selectively quoting the SCoF report and ignoring the dissent note should read the report once. The report in its concluding section (observations / recommendations) lists out its opinions clearly and nowhere in that we can find even a single line justifying the Project. The real criticism should have been on the unsuspecting complaisance the media shown in initial stages of the project by ignoring the concerns raised by eminent personalities.

It also seems that the author has no idea what the dissenting MPs (only 3 of the 34 member committee) wrote in their notes of dissent. Let’s examine one by one.

1.      Rashid Salvi, MP

He does not have any reservations on all the 12 paragraphs that raises concerns on the UID but suggests “deleting” the 13^th and concluding paragraph that asks the government to come forth with a new legislation, citing no reasons.

2.      Prem Das Rai, MP

The dissent note reads:

“At the outset I do not believe that the bill should be rejected in the manner it has been.  Since I have been inducted into the Committee recently I do not have the inputs that went in when the stakeholders and other Government departments were giving witness.  I also do not know whether we gave enough time to the UID implementers to give evidence and present their point of view.”

the thing is clear, he dissented because of “ignorance”.

3.      Manicka Tagore, MP

Manicka tagore could not attend the meeting on adoption on draft report and citing no arguments to counter the observations in the report, simply reiterates the claims by the UIDAI about plugging leakages and corruption in welfare schemes expresses dissent.

Now, Mr. Shenoy what is there in these dissent notes worthwhile to discuss? Reiterating the claims that failed to convince the SCoF won’t justify AADHAAR. Lets take them one by one:

 

 

Claims	Reality
Aadhaar can plug massive misuse of subsidy	·         Corruption and leakages in welfare schemes like PDS occur not mainly from ghost IDs but from structural, operational and administrative inadequacies. ·         Much of the diversion takes place not at the fair price shops with bogus ration-cards but at upper layers of supply chain. UID cannot solve this. Better and cheaper ways like GPS tracking of supply vehicles (as successfully implemented in Tamil Nadu) would be a good option. ·         Aadhaar cannot ensure the proper targeting of subsidy for it ensures only identity not eligibility.
Aadhaar does not need Parliament’s approval	The executive cannot do what it pleases in relation to infringing constitutional rights and protections for the reason that only Parliament and legislatures have the power to make law on the subject. If it does not need parliament’s approval why NIAI Bill was then mooted? Why did Mr. Nilekani “waited’ for the parliament’s approval (as reported by media)
Aadhaar does not compromise Privacy	Application of Driver’s Licence and Passport are significantly different from Aadhaar.  No agency has a large database comparable to UIDAI. None of the details are expected to be universal and ubiquitous.  This kind of data collection without an enabling law will surely run the risk of data abuse, misuse and theft. Especially so in the absence of Data Protection laws. Involvement of Private agencies with no experience or field knowledge or sufficient staff would aggregate the risk for they subcontract the job to others. The UIDAI doesn’t even know who is collecting what all data from whome. The so called ‘registrars’ what-all-information-they-want from the residents.
Biometric Technology is OK, UK’s National Physical Laboratory says the error rate is only 1 out of 10,000	If biometric de-duplication is possible by current technology and equipments, why doesn’t the NIST of the US certify that? L1 Identity Solutions does not possess any certification for this large scale application. “For  purpose  of NIST  PATRIOT Act  certification this  test  certifies  the  accuracy  of  the  participating systems  on  the  datasets  used  in  the  test.  This evaluation  does  not  certify  that  any  of  the  systems tested  meet  the  requirements  of  any  specific government  application.” This is what NIST say. Citing impracticability, the bio-metric ID system proposed by 10 major B-schools in the world was abandoned. As Professor Davis Moss of London School of Business pointed out the error rate predicted by the Proof of the concept report of the UIDAI (0.0025%) itself would require 18,000,000,000,000 manual checks for de-duplication. A paper by Mr. James L Wayman (Office of graduate Studies and Research, San Jose University, San Jose, USA), Mr. Antonio  Possolo  (Chief,  Information  Technology  laboratory, statistical  engineering  Division,  NIST,  USA),  Anthony  J Mansfield (National Physical Laboratory, Teddington, U K) titled “Fundamental  issues  in  biometric performance  testing:  A  modern  statistical  and  philosophical framework  for  uncertainty  assessment” shows that the uncertainty associated with biometrics is too huge that it could be hardly considered as a science in the conventional sense. If NPL study predicted 1/100000 error  rate Mr Shenoy should show the intellectual honesty to add the details like the number of people in the database, the nature of data, number of unclear biometric data involved, physical condition at which the test was conducted. Because without such a statistical control, we cannot extrapolate the result of a test to larger models. And in case of biometrics we can never achieve that statistical control. The national research Centre (NRC) of the US says biometrics is “inherently fallible”. London School of economics’ study on UK ID project found biometrics untested, unproven and unreliable.
SCoF cherry picked UK ID project to criticize aadhaar.	It is not the SCoF that cherry picked UK ID. Wipro Infosystems has in their Vision Document for UID mentioned UK ID in 2006 in support of AADHAAR. It is not the SCoF’s fault that the UK abandoned the project.
AADHAAR is like Social security Number (SSN) of the US	SSN is completely different from aadhaar. It doesn’t collect biometrics or any sensitive details. It just relates a number to a name. The real comparison should have been between the Real I D Project 2005 abandoned by the US. Also remember Australia abandoned their national biometric ID project Australia Card.
Aadhaar has no Security Issues Parliamentary standing committee did not discuss the point	The committee has expressed concern over the implications of the Project Aadhaar on national security. The committee is “The Committee are unable to understand the rationale of expanding the scheme to persons who are not citizens, as this entails numerous benefits proposed by the Government”[1] “This will, they apprehend, make even illegal immigrants entitled for an aadhaar number”. The committee especially is concerned about the efficacy of introducer system on national security. As opined by many the introducer system could result in many anti-national and anti-social elements acquiring aadhaar numbers on false addresses. The committee has also noted that the Ministry of Home affairs has expressed concern over the methodology data collection, reliability and security of the data and the chances of fraud.
Aadhaar’s benefit does not outweigh costs	The author lashes out at the SCoF for quoting the cost of the project as 150000crores. He should understand how UK ID project was found to be economically unfeasible. The cost of the project is recurring in nature. Every year enrollments have to be done for ‘new comers’. The cost of equipments for a single enrollment centre is close to 3lakh (as reported by The Hindu). Then consider the money required for installing biometric readers in every point of service provision (there are over 4.5lakh fair-price shops in India). Do the author believe that the 45000crore black money arise from ghost identities? In fact Aadhaar cannot do anything to curb high level fraud.
Failure of Bureaucracy cannot be held against AADHAAR	True. But this cannot be an excuse for launching a project without required formalities. The committee notes that “(a) no committee has been constituted to study the financial implications of the UID scheme; and (b) comparative costs of the aadhaar number and various existing ID documents are also not available.  The Committee also note that Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the UID Scheme has been done much later in April, 2011.  The Committee thus strongly disapprove of the hasty manner in which the UID scheme has been approved.  Unlike many other schemes / projects, no comprehensive feasibility study, which ought to have been done before approving such an expensive scheme, has been done involving all aspects of the UID scheme including cost-benefit analysis, comparative costs of aadhaar number and various forms of existing identity, financial implications and prevention of identity theft, for example, using hologram enabled ration card to eliminate fake and duplicate beneficiaries.”[2] How can a government approve a sum over Rs.3000 crores for a dubious project, without a benefit analysis study and the approval of the parliament? Author speaks about the Ernst & Young Project Report on UID but cunningly hide the fact that the report was made two years after the project report. How can you justify the fact that a project was allowed to start without even a detailed project report?
The SCoF did not hear any experts supporting AADHAAR	Look at the list of persons appeared before the SCOF as witnesses: UIDAI 1. Shri Nandan Nilekani, Chairman 2. Shri R.S. Sharma, Director-General Indian Banks‟ Association (IBA) 1. Shri M.D. Mallya - Chairman 2. Dr. K. Ramakrishnan - Chief Executive 3. Shri M.R. Umarji - Chief Advisor-Legal Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 1. Mr Arun Duggal, Vice Chairman, International Asset Reconstruction Company (IARC) and Chairman Shriram Capital Limited 2. Mr Chirag Jain, Chief Operating Officer Canara HSBC Oriental Bank of Commerce Life Insurance Company Limited 3. Mr Ravi Gandhi, VP, Corporate Regulatory Affairs Bharti Airtel 4. Mr Rameesh Kailasam, Program Director IBM India Pvt. Limited Enough?
SCoF raises irrelevant questions	To Mr. Shenoy the question whether Aadhaar is mandatory irrelevant. But for the rural poor who faces risks of financial exclusion this is a question of utmost importance. Comparing ration card with aadhaar is insanity.

 

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[1] Page 28, observation 2 of the report.

[2] Page 33 of the report